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I. INTRODUCTION
It is widely recognized that many American public school systems
graduate, or fail to graduate, substantial numbers of students who
are largely unprepared to play any significant role in our civic life.
This state of affairs is said to result from a number of causes, some
of which may be at least partially within the scope of responsibility
of the school or, more broadly, the state, even if these causes involve
only state inadvertence or inaction.
This state of affairs is widely lamented, but more controversial
is whether the problem is one of federal constitutional dimension
and, if so, in precisely what respects the Constitution is implicated.
Suppose a representative group of plaintiffs asserts that despite its
own due diligence, it has been graduated or been driven from the
local public school system in a condition unfit to participate with
minimal competence in the public's affairs. Could such an assertion
appropriately take the form of an alleged violation of a particular
federal constitutional right?
There are a number of individual rights provisions of the Con-
stitution to which such plaintiffs might be tempted to point, such as
those guaranteeing equal protection, due process in both procedure
and substance, the privileges and immunities of citizens, and even
the first or ninth amendment. This article argues that each of these
approaches is problematic, and that none responsively addresses the
underlying constitutional problem of broad civic incompetence. This
assertion does not mean, however, that the problem of what might
be called state-caused civic incompetence does not in any sense rise
to federal constitutional dimension or that federal constitutional
litigation is necessarily an inappropriate remedy. This article main-
tains instead that the most straightforward, least speculative, and
least strained analysis of substantial state-caused civic incompetence
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reads such a state of affairs as incompatible or incongruent with the
Constitution's text and intent as a charter of representative self-
government by enfranchised citizens. This wrong is not so directly a
matter of the violation of the individual constitutional rights of the
ill-prepared students, or of inequality of individual rights, as it is a
collective failure to implement a presupposition of the Constitution,
or a basic assumption embodied in the Constitution itself. This
presupposition might be stated in various ways, but the essential
notion is that under this Constitution, as distinct from most others,
government is to be in a sense self-government. To go further, it
might be argued that this Constitution envisions at least the possibility
of a politics in which the natural play of allied and opposed interest
groups is partly transcended by a politics of citizen reflection, dis-
cussion, deliberation, and choice based on a desire to recognize and
promote the public good.
This article suggests that if the drafters and ratifiers of our
Constitution sought to structure the political process partly through
that document, the state may not legitimately act, or fail to act,
without justification in ways that tend, even unintentionally, to
substantially undermine the crucial presuppositions relied upon by
and embodied in the ratified Constitution. Such a state of affairs
does not violate any particular provision of the Constitution in the
sense that an unreasonable search or seizure does. However, it
presents us with the same choice of either allowing the repugnant
state-caused condition to continue or living fully by the adopted
Constitution as the supreme law of the land. Those persons left
grossly undereducated for reasons at least partially attributable to
the state are, of course, in some sense individually the victims of the
state, and undoubtedly suffer competitive job market harm. However,
the essence of this article is not that they as individual victims are
denied a constitutional right to meaningfully contribute to or indi-
vidually profit from public life, but rather that the public as a whole
is denied the possibility of their so contributing, contrary to the clear
sense of the Constitution as a charter of collective self-government.
The public as a whole is the precise relevant victim, just as the
individual uneducated student is the most direct victim of his com-
petitive injuries in the job market.
Despite this unusual focus, it hardly seems sensible, in view of
the vitally important stakes, to conclude that even what might be
thought of as appalling levels of state-caused civic incompetence
amount only to a nonjusticiable social problem, that no one in
particular has legal standing to sue or a cause of action, and that
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the problem must be solved through the political process alone
without the threat or assistance of constitutionally based litigation.
Instead, we should allow appropriate individuals who have been
rendered civically incompetent by the state to sue for declaratory or
injunctive relief on behalf of the broader enfranchised public or as
the public's agent, if nonjudicial remedies seem potentially inadequate
and if the practical problems of such litigation seem surmountable
or at least endurable.
While the approach suggested in this article is novel and perhaps
radical, it can be placed in a reasonably supportive established case-
law environment. It possesses some important practical advantages
over nonjudicial approaches and over individual constitutional right-
based, as well as nonconstitutionally based, litigation strategies. The
discussion below outlines the nature and severity of state-caused civic
incompetence, addresses and resolves the leading practical problems
attending the implementation of the approach alluded to above,
responds to other possible objections, including those relating to
federalism, the complexity of the litigation, the suppression of di-
versity and experimentation in education, and the feasibility of ju-
dicially inspired compliance or redress in this area, and elaborates
on the costs and disadvantages of alternative strategies.
II. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION ENVIRONMENT
It can fairly be said that, at a minimum, the existing body of
federal constitutional decisions establishes no significant obstacles to
the viability of litigation focusing on a school system's or state's
failure to provide a reasonable opportunity to acquire, through public
school education, a minimally adequate degree of civic deliberative
competence to substantial numbers of students. The most closely
related federal constitutional litigation is generally individual rights-
based in nature, even where the cases argue that it is a broader class
of poor persons, or persons attending public school in poor districts,
who are disadvantaged. The theory most frequently selected in the
federal constitutional context is that the plaintiff students, or would-
be students, have been denied the equal protection of the laws.
The two leading cases in the federal equal protection area are
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez' and Plyler
v. Doe.2 Rodriguez involved an equal protection challenge to the
1. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
2. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). See also Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 108 S. Ct. 2481
(1988).
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Texas state system of financing public schools, based on substantial
disparities among the school districts in resources available and
expenditures for elementary and secondary education. The Supreme
Court upheld an admittedly imperfect financing system,3 finding no
relevant suspect classification of rich and poor persons or districts, 4
and finding that no constitutionally fundamental right or interest in
education was burdened by the Texas system.5 The Court therefore
applied only minimum scrutiny, and held that the Texas school
financing system was rationally related to the legitimate state interest
in local control of the public educational process. 6
In an important qualification, the Court indicated that:
Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a State's financing
system occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities
to any of its children, that argument provides no basis for finding
an interference with fundamental rights where only relative differences
in spending levels are involved and where-as is true in the present
case-no charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide
each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills
necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full
participation in the political process.7
The majority in Rodriguez therefore seemed to disavow any impli-
cation as to the equal protection standards to be applied to a case
in which the plaintiff alleged the educational opportunity afforded
to be radically inadequate, or inadequate in any sense other than
being merely unequal to that accorded others.' Logically, the edu-
cational opportunity afforded two different persons might be fully
adequate on some external standard, yet unequal, or equal yet
inadequate. The equality and adequacy of educational opportunity
tend to merge to the extent that one wishes to measure adequacy of
educational opportunity in terms such as labor market competitive-
ness or the ability to successfully promote one's own interests. Thus,
Rodriguez holds open the possibility of a fundamental federal con-
3. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 55.
4. Id. at 28.
5. Id. at 37.
6. Id. at 47-50, 55.
7. Id. at 37.
8. This qualification was noted in cases such as Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 18, 554 P.2d
139, 143-44 (1976) ("no charge that a basic minimal education was not provided in all districts"
in the Rodriguez case). The language in Rodriguez defining a minimally adequate educational
opportunity, quoted above, has been quoted with approval in state constitutional cases such
as McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 644, 285 S.E.2d 156, 165 (1981).
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stitutional right to a minimally adequate educational opportunity, as
at least loosely defined in Rodriguez. It probably goes too far to say
that "Ithe 'unheld holding' of Rodriguez was that all Americans
have a right to an adequate education, ' 9 but Rodriguez is not
incompatible with such an argument.
In Plyler, the Supreme Court struck down on equal protection
grounds a Texas statute denying to undocumented alien children
within Texas the same access to free public education as that accorded
to citizen children. The Court majority explicitly denied that educa-
tion in public schools rose to the level of a fundamental constitutional
right, 10 but did recognize that education unavoidably plays a funda-
mental role in the public life in a practical sense,." and that education
can therefore hardly be constitutionally classed with other mere
governmental benefits.' 2 The vital importance of at least minimal
educational opportunity for the public and for the directly affected
individuals played a crucial role in the Court's attribution of irra-
tionality to the Texas statute. 3
While some of the language in the Plyler majority opinion should
directly discourage those favoring fundamental individual right status
for minimal or equal educational opportunity, the Court has even
more recently, in dicta, appeared to reopen the door. In Papasan v.
A lain,'4 the Court served notice that "[a]s Rodriguez and Plyler
indicate, this Court has not yet definitively settled the questions
whether a minimally adequate education is a fundamental right and
whether a statute alleged to discriminatorily infringe that right should
be accorded heightened equal protection review."'"
9. Preovolos, Rodriguez Revisited: Federalism, Meaningful Access, and the Right to
Adequate Education, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 75, 75 (1980). But see Kadrmas v. Dickinson
Pub. Schools, 108 S. Ct. 2481 (1988) (5-4 decision) (no fundamental 'right to public school
education triggering heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause).
10. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223 ("[nlor is education a fundamental right") & 221 ("Public
education is not a 'right' granted to individuals by the Constitution.") (citing Rodriguez).
11. Id. at 221.
12. Id. See also Hutchinson, More Substantive Equal Protection? A Note on Plyler v.
Doe, 1982 Sup. CT. RaV. 167, 175 (1983).
13. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223-24.
14. 106 S. Ct. 2932 (1986).
15. Id. at 2944. See also Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking
Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 58 & n.223 (1987) ("[E]ducation is going through
a period of ripening at the state level which may bear fruit in the Supreme Court."). But see
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 108 S. Ct. 2481 (1988) (5-4 decision) (no fundamental
right to public school education triggering heightened scrutiny under the equal protection
clause).
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Realistically, the Court may be groping for a way of constitu-
tionally recognizing the importance of basic educational opportunity
without simultaneously committing itself to the proposition that states
must provide essentially equal educational opportunity in practice to
all students, if the states provide educational opportunity to any.
The Supreme Court often seeks, as do other courts, to distinguish
between the absolute versus merely relative deprivation of an alleged
right to educational opportunity 6 in order to pave the way for an
inference that an "absolute" deprivation of educational opportunity
might be constitutionally unacceptable, where mere relative depriva-
tions or inequalities in educational opportunity might be more easily
justified.
An attempt to turn the distinction between absolute and merely
relative deprivation or discrimination into a constitutionally crucial
line of demarcation may be unsatisfactory. Virtually any significant
deprivation of a right or discrimination contains both relative and
absolute dimensions, and it will often be difficult to tell whether a
particular deprivation is either relative or absolute. Often, the ine-
quality of the state of affairs, or the relative dimension, may seem
more abhorrent than any absolute loss to those disfavored. Some-
times, even if we set considerations of inequality or relative depri-
vation aside, a state of affairs may seem constitutionally unjustifiable
even though some measure of opportunity or benefit is being provided
to even the least well-off.
For example, if one group of children is afforded the opportunity
to obtain only a fourth grade education, while another group is given
the opportunity to obtain a twelfth grade education, it is true that
the first group is relatively deprived, but they are also being absolutely
deprived of the opportunity to acquire a twelfth or even a sixth
grade education, a fact of independent significance. Is such a limited
educational opportunity an absolute or a relative deprivation? The
16. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973); Lujan
v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1023 (Colo. 1982) ("[AII educational financing
cases are sui generis in the sense that the alleged deprivation is relative rather than absolute.");
Horton v. Meskill, 195 Conn. 24, 35, 486 A.2d 1099, 1105 (1985) ("the discrimination is
relative rather than absolute.") (quoting the earlier Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 645,
376 A.2d 359, 373 (1977)); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 487, 303 A.2d 273, 279-80
(quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 25 (absence of "absolute deprivation")), cert. denied sub
nom. Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d
368, 387 n.14, 390 N.E.2d 813, 825 n.14 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980) (same);
Chambers, Adequate Education for All: A Right, An Achievable Goal, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 55, 68 (1987).
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question is no more answerable than that of whether a $1.50 poll
tax amounts to an absolute deprivation or merely a relative discrim-
inatory burden on the exercise of the franchise. The Supreme Court
struck down such a poll tax in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections17
without bothering to apply any weaker equal protection standards
with regard to those poor who are able to scrape up the $1.50 than
with regard to those who cannot, and are therefore presumably
absolutely deprived of the franchise. It is possible to argue that a
low poll tax does not absolutely deprive anyone of the franchise; it
merely requires greater exertions for some than for others. This
argument leaves a rather murky definition of what should count as
an absolute deprivation and why relative deprivations should not be
so constitutionally suspect.
In many equal protection cases it is the attempt to subordinate
a given class, or to treat a class as inferior, that shocks the consti-
tutional conscience as much as any particular thing or level of
provision of which they are being absolutely deprived. The relative
can constitutionally matter to us as much as the absolute. The fact
that some provision is made for those disfavored may seem consti-
tutionally inconsequential. Let us suppose that a state's school-finance
system is such that some students are afforded only a fourth grade
education, or are taught only in bus stations, and are excused from
further schooling at age nine, while other students receive exemplary
educational opportunities. If we are seeking to set the appropriate
constitutional test for such a state of affairs, how likely are we to
adopt as the crucial step in our logic the truth that no child is being
absolutely or completely deprived of an education? If a state is
constitutionally challenged for completely denying any educational
opportunity to a group of children, can the state reasonably lighten
its constitutional burden by providing for a single day's instruction
for them, or by merely encouraging them to watch public television?
Thus, while the Court is understandably seeking some middle
ground between legitimizing complete state neglect of education for
some on the one hand, and being driven by the logic of fundamental
rights and the equal protection clause into the political, moral, and
practical morass of requiring genuinely equal educational opportu-
nities, however measured, on the other, the purported distinction
between absolute and relative deprivation is either incoherent or
simply not useful. The approach traced in this article avoids any
17. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). See also Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 118 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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reliance on the equal protection clause, and instead focuses on the
possibility of demonstrable incapacity on the part of many students
to participate with even modest competence in local and national
civic life, for reasons at least partially attributable to the state, and
contrary to the understanding and public expectation manifested in
the text of the Constitution. While the Supreme Court has not had
the opportunity to work out a coherent, principled, plausible ap-
proach to constitutional questions of educational opportunity gen-
erally, it seems fair to conclude that the Court's jurisprudence of
educational opportunity on equal protection grounds poses no insu-
perable obstacles to the approach to educational opportunity, focus-
ing on civic competence, developed in this article."8
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF CIVIC COMPETENCE AND THE MAGNITUDE
OF THE CONTEMPORARY DEFAULT
Even for those who deny that educational opportunity is con-
stitutionally paramount or that educational opportunity must be
accorded to all in a roughly equal fashion, it is difficult to contend
that at least up to some level, the opportunity to develop what this
article has referred to as minimum civic competence is practically
insignificant for the maintenance of the American constitutional
system. As a practical matter, provision for at least this sort of
18. It is worth noting that the state court decisions on state constitutional grounds, while
divided on whether educational opportunity rises to the level of a fundamental constitutional
right for purposes of invoking strict scrutiny in equal protection cases, are widely sympathetic
to the notion of a state constitutional right to at least a minimally adequate educational
opportunity. See, e.g., Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1025 (Colo.
1982) (while equal school expenditures are not constitutionally required, educational opportu-
nities must be "thorough"); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 387, 390 N.E.2d
813, 825 (1979) (concluding in dicta that a grossly underfinanced school system might not be
constitutionally "thorough and efficient"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980).
Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 806, 537 P.2d 635, 648 (1975) similarly provides
that while education is not a fundamental right, and while there is no mandate of equal
expenditures for all students under the state constitution, the state may owe a state constitutional
obligation to teach students the educational rudiments, and beyond. Also in dicta, Board of
Education v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 48-49, 439 N.E.2d 359, 369, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 653
(1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983), at least holds open the possibility of judicial
intervention in the event of a demonstration of "gross and glaring inadequacy" of educational
opportunity. At a minimum, some state constitutional decisions explicitly contrast a deprivation
of equal school expenditures with a presumably more grievous deprivation of educational
adequacy. See, e.g., Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 651-53, 458
A.2d 758, 787 (1983). Many of the issues frequently raised in the state constitutional context
are thoroughly aired in Northshore School District No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685, 530
P.2d 178 (1974) (en banc), rev'd in part, Seattle School District No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d
476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978) (en banc).
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education is necessary for the survival of our constitutional system
in recognizable fashion. 19 This proposition is both intuitively obvious
and confirmable by social science research. 20 This is a matter apart
from any competitive advantages or other individualized benefits that
an education may bring to the educated person, and apart from any
purely economic benefits that accrue collectively to an educated
populace .21
Civic competence requires more than bare literacy," but it is
also important, unfortunately, to recall that it does require bare
literacy at a minimum. What civic competence ultimately requires is,
at the margins, endlessly debatable. But any residual vagueness of
the concept is unimportant if it is clear that civic competence generally
requires literacy at a minimum and that the opportunity for literacy
apparently cannot be taken for granted. It has recently been observed
that:
Many black and poor children, through no fault of their own,
continue to be deprived of training in even the most basic skills,
such as reading, writing and arithmetic. This deprivation works a
profound and lifelong injury to these neglected youths, and cripples
their ability to participate in political and economic life. 23
The numerical figures underlying this truism are of necessity
imprecise, but a forty percent functional illiteracy rate among mi-
nority youth has been cited. 24 Among the American population as a
whole, the variance in the calculations of illiteracy 25 is, for present
19. J. DEwEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 87-88 (1944); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 221 (1972); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 817, 537 P.2d 635, 659 (1975) (Donaldson,
J., dissenting).
20. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S.
68, 77 (1979)); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd..of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 681, 458 A.2d 758,
802 (1983) (Cole, J., dissenting). The necessity of broad educational opportunity to the
preservation and operation of the constitutional system is one of the senses in which it can
be said that "[elducation is, however, not like a cake that has to be divided fairly [between
the children]." See Hare, Opportunity for What? Some Remarks on Current Disputes About
Equality in Education, 3 OXFORD REV. EDUC. 207, 210 (1977).
21. See E. HIRSCH, CULTURAL LITERACY 1-2 (1987).
22. See A. GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 139 (1987).
23. Chambers, supra note 16, at 55.
24. See id. at 57 and the widely cited report, NATIONAL COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC.,
A NATION AT RISK: Tr IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM 8 (1983) [hereinafter A NATION
AT RISK].
25. Compare, e.g., E. HIRSCH, supra note 21, at 2 ("only two thirds of our citizens are
literate") with A NATION AT RISK, supra note 24, at 8 ("Some 23 million American adults are
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purposes, less significant than the undeniable magnitude of the
problem. Among the perhaps 23 to 25 million illiterate Americans,
there can be political behavior only sharply limited in its range and
depth:
Illiterate citizens seldom vote. Those who do are forced to cast a
vote of questionable worth. They cannot make informed decisions
based on serious print information. Sometimes they can be alerted
to their interests by aggressive voter education. More frequently,
they vote for a face, a smile, or a style, not for a mind or character
or body of beliefs. 26
Such persons are generally not civically competent, and to the extent
that these persons make up our enfranchised electorate, the consti-
tutional system of self-governance lacks its own distinctive practical
prerequisites. 27 Even those limited numbers of the illiterate who vote,
and who might in some sense be said to have perceived and voted
in accordance with their own interests, might still be said to be
deficient in civic competence insofar as they lack the capacity to
conscientiously choose between voting in their own perceived interests
and voting on the basis of a sustained, deliberative, dialogic process
for the perceived broader public or general interest.
The skills of literacy by themselves do not guarantee civic
competence. Referring to the widely discussed problem of substantial"cultural illiteracy" among elementary school students, Professor
Diane Ravitch has written that students in such circumstances "can
read the words put in front of them, but they have no 'furniture' in
their minds, no vocabulary of historical persons or events to draw
upon, no reference to the ordinary literary images that fifth graders
once imbibed in every common school in the nation." ' 2 More con-
cretely, William Bennett has reported anecdotally that "[riecently I
met with 70 high school student leaders-all excellent students-from
functionally illiterate by the simplest tests of everyday reading, writing, and comprehension.")
and J. KOZOL, ILLITERATE AMERICA 4 (1985) ("Twenty-five million American adults cannot
read the poison warnings on a can of pesticide, a letter from their child's teacher, or the front
page of a daily paper. An additional 35 million read only at a level which is less than equal
to the full survival needs of our society.").
26. J. KOZOL, supra note 25, at 23.
27. Id. ("So long as 60 million people are denied significant participation, the government
is neither of, nor for, nor by, the people.").
28. D. RAVITCH, THE SCHOOLS WE DESERVE 79 (1985). See also E. BOYER, HIGH SCHOOL
95 (1983); E. HIRSCH, supra note 21.
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all over the country. When I asked them how many had heard of
the Federalist Papers, only seven raised their hands." 2 9
Whether the capacities of the average or the most talented
students have recently decreased ° is for present purposes of secondary
importance in comparison to the unavoidable fact that substantial
numbers of adults lack and evidently will continue to lack civic
competence. A substantial segment of our adult society lacks suffi-
cient knowledge of our society or its constitutional institutions in
particular to intelligently value or to maintain and operate those
institutions.3 The ability of our constitutional system to perpetuate
itself therefore becomes dependent upon the competencies of only a
portion of those constitutionally intended for enfranchisement.
Even if it could be shown that technical and cultural illiteracy,
insofar as they bear upon civic competence, are in the process of
being reduced, the constitutional problem remains significant. In an
earlier era, the franchise was obviously less widespread and the
political problems of the day tended to be complex only in principle,
rather than technically complex as well. With a narrow potential
electorate and with most political issues not of daunting technical
complexity, even relatively high levels of illiteracy were not necessarily
incongruent with constitutional presuppositions. Today, however,
with much broader enfranchisement and the basic domestic and
foreign policy questions unavoidably complex in every sense, a delib-
erative, dialogic process of self-government through representatives
selected with reasonable intelligence requires a greater level of mini-
mum competency than before.
IV. CIVIC COMPETENCE AS A CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUPPOSITION
The explicit text of the Constitution provides for active popular
participation by the enfranchised in the election of members of the
House of Representatives,3 2 the Senate,33 and to a degree, the Pres-
ident of the United States.3 4 Some measure of the intent underlying
29. W. BENNETT, To RECLAIM A LEGACY: A REPORT ON THE HUMANITIES IN HIGHER
EDUCATION 21 (1984) (emphasis in the original). For reference to some of the relevant statistical
evidence see also E. HIRSCH, supra note 21, at 4-5.
30. See E. HIRSCH, supra note 21, at 4-5; Finn, The High School Dropout Puzzle, 87
PUB. INTEREST 3, 21-22 (1987).
31. See E. HIRSCH, supra note 21, at 6-7.
32. U.S. CONST. art I, § 2.
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 & amend. XVII.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. While this kind of provision, together with those extending
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the provisions respecting the exercise of the franchise can be author-
itatively derived from the preamble of the Constitution itself. 35 This
is not to suggest that the preamble itself bindingly confers or limits
rights and powers, but that the preamble may provide some possibility
of insight into the intent underlying the binding provisions of the
Constitution.
The preamble, which is spoken in the voice of "we the people,"
suggests that the provisions of the Constitution generally are to be
construed as an attempt to "secure the blessings of liberty" and to"promote the general welfare." The franchise itself, and its progres-
sive historical extension, is therefore systematically meaningful insofar
as its operation may be thought to promote the governmental effort
to "secure the blessings of liberty" or to "promote the general
welfare." It would be self-defeating and incoherent to constitutionally
provide for the popular franchise while intending or expecting it to
be exercised in ways inimical to or patently inadequate to attain the
goals of the Constitution as expressed in the preamble.
Of course, general language such as "promote the general wel-
fare" cannot afford precise insight into how the constitutional gov-
ernmental structure was intended or expected to operate. The historical
evidence suggests that the idea of promoting the general welfare was,
and continues to be, subject to two important partially conflicting
and partially overlapping lines of interpretation. These simplified
models may be referred to respectively as the "interest group" and
the "public interest" approaches to how the constitutional system of
popular political participation is envisioned to promote the "general"
welfare.
The "interest group" approach to a politics of pursuit of the
general welfare has been described by Professor Cass Sunstein as
entailing the view that:
and protecting the franchise, may be thought of as individual rights-conferring provisions, it
is also sensible to think of them as structural provisions of the Constitution or, more precisely,
as "constitutive" provisions. Cf. Powell, How Does the Constitution Structure Government?,
in A WORKABLE GOVERNMENT?: THE CONSTITUTION AFTER 200 YEARS 13, 13 (B. Marshall ed.
1987) (distinguishing between rights-provisions and structural elements of the Constitution).
35. Note the progressive expansion of the franchise through amendment XV (race),
amendment XIX (gender), amendment XXIV (poll or other tax restriction on the franchise),
and amendment XXVI (age). Of course, where a text such as the Constitution is unequivocal
and not fairly susceptible of differing interpretations, the preamble cannot be used simply to
introduce and then resolve ambiguity, but a preamble may properly be looked at to "ascertain
intent and meaning," and "has been said to be a key to open the understanding of a statute."
Price v. Forrest, 173 U.S. 410, 427 (1899).
[Vol. 13
Public School Education
[P]olitics mediates the struggle among self-interested groups for
scarce social resources. Only nominally deliberative, politics is a
process of conflict and compromise among various social interests.
Under the [interest group] conception, people come to the political
process with preselected interests that they seek to promote through
political conflict and compromise. Preferences are not shaped through
governance, but enter into the process as exogenous variables.3 6
On the interest group model in its purest form, the "general welfare"
enshrined in the preamble amounts only to the aggregation, in some
fashion or another, of perceived individual or group interests.37
Education, whatever its virtues, bears the risks of tyranny insofar as
it may involve the illicit suppression of preference or the illicit
substitution of an "educator's" preference for that of the person or
group subjected to "education." 3
Education is more unreservedly central to the second, or "public
interest" approach, which conceives of popular self-rule not so much
in terms of the competitive promotion of preconceived private indi-
vidual or group interests, but in terms of reflection, deliberation,
and public dialogue aimed at the common goal of discerning and
implementing that which will promote the general welfare. 9 Partic-
ularly important for purposes of this article is the disposition of the"public interest" approach to envision the political process as legit-
imately involving the development or reformation of individual or
group preferences, rather than viewing preferences as either merely
given, as arbitrary, or not legitimately alterable.40
Of course, classification of individual framers within the scope
of either of these approaches is difficult' and both approaches retain
36. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 32 (1985)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups]. See also Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L.
REv. 873, 879 (1987) ("modern interest group pluralism" as viewing politics "as an unprincipled
struggle among self-interested groups for scarce social resources"). For a leading descriptive
model, see Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMr. Sci. 3
(1971).
37. See Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 36, at 32-33.
38. See id. at 33.
39. Id. at 31. See also Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HAsv. L.
REv. 4, 19 (1986) (referring to Sunstein's "attractive conception").
40. See Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 36, at 31.
41. For example, while James Madison was not entirely sanguine about the possibility of
broad political deliberation and dialogue at the general citizen level, he presumed that at least
elected representatives could potentially engage in genuine deliberation and that the pursuit of
private gain did not exhaust the scope of politics. See D. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF
THE FEDERALIST 125 (1984); Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 36, at 76 n.203. Thomas
Jefferson emphasized particularly the deliberative elements of the pursuit of the general welfare,
as has been recognized recently by Professor Hirsch. See E. HIRSCH, supra note 21, at 12-13.
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modern sympathizers. 42 This state of affairs reflects the undoubted
consensus that while education may, at worst, be debased into an
oppressive instrument of indoctrination, manipulation, or coercion,
education is also typically the foundation for what this article has
referred to as civic competence. If the Constitution in some sense
entrusts in the electorate essential political decision-making, at least
through selected representatives, in order to promote the public liberty
or the public welfare, in either of the senses discussed above, it is
because the Constitution relies upon and presupposes a public ca-
pacity to "deliberate and communicate ' 43 among the electorate. This
public capacity, or civic competence, requires at least a certain
measure of opportunity for effective education among those entrusted
with the franchise. 44 To will the end, or the constitutional scheme
outlined above, is to will the plainly indispensable means, including
the availability of at least some modest educational opportunity
reasonably coextensive with the responsibilities of the franchise and
of constitutional citizenship in general.
The closer one approaches the pure "interest group" conception,
the greater the emphasis on education or educational opportunity as
merely a private resource or individual advantage in the competitive
struggle to promote one's own interests within the sphere of politics.
If politics were simply a zero-sum struggle over shares, education for
civic competence would then more exclusively take on the quality of
a putative individual right held on an equal or unequal basis. How-
ever, our constitutional system itself embodies neither the "interest
group" nor the "public interest" conception exclusively or in purest
form, and must be operated so as to provide for both of these
42. Compare, e.g., Stigler, supra note 36 (model of competitive bidding for political
influence to promote perceived interests) with J. HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HumAN INTERESTS
53 (J. Shapiro trans. 1971) ("Emancipation from the compulsion of internal nature succeeds
to the degree that institutions based on force are replaced by an organization of social relations
that is bound only to communication free from domination."). See also id. at 55 (emphasizing
the role of discussion) & 315 (postulating a condition of "unconstrained communication");
Habermas, Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence, 13 INQUIRY 360, 372 (1970)
(truth as referring to "a consensus achieved in unrestrained and universal discourse").
43. See E. HIRSCH, supra note 21, at 12.
44. See id.; Hare, supra note 20, at 215. Note that it is possible in principle to support
minimal educational opportunity for the enfranchised without being logically committed to a
constitutional right, or a presupposition in our sense, to individual basic subsistence. The
framers might rationally have assumed that either one starves or one does not, but if one does
not, and wishes to vote, or otherwise politically participate, the opportunity for the vote to
be a potentially helpful, minimally thoughtful, minimally informed vote must generally be
provided.
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historically important approaches to potentially play some role.
V. THE UNDERSUPPLY OF BASIC EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY AND
POSSIBLE JUDICIAL RESPONSES
Even under a purely competitive "interest group" model of the
political process, the public may benefit, in the sense of more fully
realizing their own political goals, from affording some modest
educational opportunity to virtually all of their fellow citizens. Milton
Friedman, whose basic sympathies for competitive market processes
seem well-established, has observed that:
A stable and democratic society is impossible without a minimum
degree of literacy and knowledge on the part of most citizens and
without widespread acceptance of some common set of values.
Education can contribute to both. In consequence, the gain from
the education of a child accrues not only to the child or to his
parents but also to other members of the society. The education of
my child contributes to your welfare by promoting a stable and
democratic society.45
Thus, even on a purely competitive view, civic competence cannot
be understood apart from the dimension in which it promotes an
essentially universal or genuinely collective interest, rather than con-
stituting merely a putative right, equally or unequally distributed,
through which individuals may promote their own narrow political
interests.
Education in this sense is a "public good" and will tend to be
undersupplied by the market. Professor Friedman recognizes that A's
contributing to the educational socialization of B contributes not
only to A and B's political welfare, but to that of C and D as well,
who cannot practically be identified and charged for the benefit
accruing to them from B's socialization.4 6 C, D, and A have every
reason, therefore, to seek to become free riders who benefit from
civically competent fellow citizens whether they contribute to the cost
of B's educational opportunity or not. We should therefore not
expect the optimal amount of civic educational opportunity to be"naturally" supplied by the market.
Recognizing civic competence as a public good, we may have
some reservations about fully accepting the view, as expressed by
45. M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 86 (1962).
46. Id.
19881
Southern Illinois University Law Journal
the New York Court of Appeals, that "the amounts, sources, and
objectives of expenditures of public moneys for educational pur-
poses . . . appropriately is largely left to the interplay of the interests
and forces directly involved and indirectly affected, in the arenas
of legislative and executive activity." 47 Many of the young residents
of any city or state may eventually move to other jurisdictions,
leaving those who helped pay for their civic competence with only
a small portion of the accruing benefits. That the city or state may
perhaps later benefit from the influx of civically competent young
persons now in other jurisdictions not now identifiable is practically
irrelevant. Cities or states may, for reasons such as these, under-
supply educational opportunity for civic competence from the stand-
point of the welfare of the society as a whole. Local control over
educational spending, even to the extent that it is a matter of
genuine local choice, cannot guarantee a socially optimal result. 41
One other more exotic, but practically significant, problem lies
in the fact that much of the public benefit that will accrue from
civic competence bestowed on a young student will accrue not to the
voters of today, but to those of a generation or so from now.
Obviously, there may be substantial identification or overlap of
interest in this regard among generations. Neverthelesss, to the degree
that one electoral generation discounts the welfare of another, the
public good to future citizen C of C's fellow citizen B's civic
competence may well tend to be undersupplied by existing citizens A
today, to the extent that not yet existing Cs cannot bargain with the
present generation A .49
Compounding these difficulties is the undeniable fact that in-
creasing the minimum educational opportunity available to public
school students tends, in many geographical areas, to involve in some
measure a redistributive transfer from the middle class to those less
47. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 38-39, 439 N.E.2d 359, 363, 453 N.Y.S.2d
643, 648 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983).
48. Cf., e.g., Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 377-78, 390 N.E.2d 813,
820 (1979) (finding local control to be a "rational basis" supporting the Ohio system of public
school financing), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980).
49. For a sense of the variability of approaches to the discounting of future welfare and
of the inclination to benefit current cohorts at the expense of the future, consider the political
difficulty of achieving substantial federal budget deficit reduction, despite the widespread belief
that large federal deficits involve a substantial redistribution of wealth from future to present
voters, and see Wilson, The Rediscovery of Character: Private Virtue and Public Policy, 81
PUB. INTEREST 3, 5, 10-13 (1985). See also J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND
DEMOCRACY 161 (3d ed. 1962); Buchanan, The Samaritan's Dilemma, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY,
AND ECONOMIC THEORY 84, 84 n.6 (E. Phelps ed. 1975).
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well-off' ° and to those with generally less political influence to
effectively express their will in the state legislature." Thus, there is
no guarantee that a legislature will reflect the degree of enlightened
self-interest and altruism necessary to provide financially for a rea-
sonable possibility of civic competence for the least well-off citizens
or school districts. This would, on the approach developed here, be
logically and practically inconsistent with the intent underlying the
Constitution, but this inconsistency also should be no surprise, in
view of the ample historical precedent for such inconsistency between
the actual features of state-established school systems and the pro-
visions of the Constitution. 2
There is no guarantee that either the market or the legislature
will generate either the socially optimal or the constitutionally mini-
mal sufficient level of opportunity for civic competence among the
enfranchised. Litigation directed toward obtaining some form of
judicial mandate or incentive toward such a goal, or at least the
credible threat of such litigation, may therefore be required. The
approach adopted in this article is to view the provision of franchise-
wide or citizenship-wide minimal civic competence opportunity as
simply constitutionally mandated, or as a condition that must obtain
if the text and intent underlying the Constitution are to be practically
or meaningfully implemented.
Those deprived of the requisite educational opportunity plainly
may suffer in a variety of other practical or constitutional respects.
For purposes of this analysis, however, they are merely the logical
persons to be granted standing to redress a serious, not otherwise
resolvable unconstitutional state of affairs, as they embody most
directly and severely an injury to all citizens who would benefit from
a more universally shared civic dialogue on the governmental issues
of the day. There is a sense in which such persons allege only injuries
common to all persons, which suggests a denial of standing." Nev-
ertheless, on balance it seems best to suggest that a person who has
been rendered civically incompetent by virtue of state policy or state
action, and who can plausibly allege the redressability of the injury
to herself or others through some sort of cognizable judicial remedy,
is not seeking to litigate a mere abstract, general, or contrived
50. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
53. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). But cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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grievance in which his or her interest is merely attenuated or ideo-
logical, or in which we ought reasonably to accept final disposition
by the political branches . 4 At some point, we must choose between
the last degree of doctrinal fastidiousness on the standing issue in
other contexts, and the last substantial opportunity for redress of a
constitutional harm with severe, widespread, and dramatic potential
impact.
While individual rights-based approaches to minimum or equal
educational opportunity present reduced traditional standing prob-
lems, they suffer not only from possible excessive stringency, but
from the vices of indefiniteness, indeterminacy of result, monumental
complexity, and irrelevance to the essentially public, collective nature
of the problem of civic incompetence. Professor Kurland has noted,
with regard to an individually-based claim to adequate educational
opportunity, that approaches based on the equal protection clause
seem irrelevant: "It is not equality but quality with which we are
concerned." 55 Reference to the privileges and immunities clause, 6
while avoiding the errant focus on questions of equality,5 7 leads us
into the virtual "dead letter" or at best undeveloped status of the
fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities clause, and more
importantly, the misconception that the essence of the problem of
broad civic incompetence is one of violated individual constitutional
rights. The same absence of responsive logical fit with the nature of
the civic incompetence problem also attends any attempt to draw
upon the equally murky ninth amendment59 or the doctrine of sub-
stantive due process. 60
54. For a general discussion of current standing doctrine, in both its Article III and
prudential components, see Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
55. Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come Round at Last?" 1972
WASH. U.L.Q. 405, 419. But see Preovolos, supra note 9, at 118 (At the level of broad
individual interest, adequacy and equality of education actually converge.).
56. See Kurland, supra note 55, at 419; Chambers, supra note 16, at 68-69.
57. But see Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685, 720-21, 530
P.2d 178, 198 (1974) (en banc) (finding the federal equal protection clause and the state
constitutional guarantee of (equal) privileges and immunities to be coextensive), rev'd in part,
Seattle School Dist. No. I v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978) (en banc).
58. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 319 (3d ed. 1986);
G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 448 (1986)
(discussing the impact of The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)); L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 558-59 (2d ed. 1988). See also B. SIEGAN, THE SUPREME
COURT'S CONSTITUTION 68 (1987).
59. See Chambers, supra note 16, at 69.
60. See Preovolous, supra note 9, at 119. Constitutional arguments based on privileges or
immunities, the ninth amendment, or substantive due process additionally should confront the
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To some minimal degree, the problem of civic incompetence
perhaps can be judicially mitigated by recourse to theories not
dependent upon federal constitutional rights. Some state constitutions
contain education provisions which are at least open to interpretation
as a guarantee of minimal educational opportunity for individual
competitive labor market purposes or competitive political purposes,
if not also for the broader civic health of the polity. 6' Recourse to
state constitutional provisions, however, risks a piecemeal and non-
uniform result nationally in addressing what this article has depicted
as a national problem.
For corresponding reasons, pursuing the possibility of an entirely
nonconstitutional tort remedy based on alleged state negligence or a
state failure to provide for minimal educational opportunity62 is
inadequate. The courts have rightly been wary of awarding money
damages to individual ill-educated graduates 63 on any theory. This is
sensible from the perspective of this article. If the courts are to
presume to extract or redirect significant amounts of money from or
within the public school systems, such expenditures should go not
toward compensating those badly educated, but directly toward re-
ducing the amount and severity of bad public education. Finally, it
would be perfectly reasonable for the courts to hold on the issue of
causation that overall, or in the statistical aggregate, the state may
bear a judicially detectable responsibility for the extent of civic
incompetence in a way sufficient for the theory presented in this
article. However, the courts are not equipped to reliably determine,
in individual cases, whether a given student's educational deficiencies
should be ascribed to the state, or instead to non-state "physical,
argument that the State's failure to affirmatively provide for a particular level of educational
opportunity does not impair anyone's liberty in a constitutional sense. See B. StEGAN, supra
note 58, at 94; Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 864
(1986). But see generally Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987).
61. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 514, 303 A.2d 273, 295, cert. denied sub
nom. Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Seattle School Dist. No. I v. State, 90 Wash.
2d 476, 516, 585 P.2d 71, 94 (1978) (en banc). But cf. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free
School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 443, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (1979)
(rejecting individual judicial enforceability).
62. See Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1976); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d
1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979) for cases at least hinting at a constitutional or non-constitutional
remedy, even though these cases are perhaps more accurately read as "educational malpractice"
claim cases.
63. See cases cited supra note 62 and Ratner, Rebuttal of Elson, 63 TEXAs L. REV. 919,
919 n.l (1985).
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neurological, emotional, cultural, [or] environmental" 64 causes, in
the way a tort standard requires.
VI. CONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATED OPPORTUNITY TO ACQUIRE
MINIMUM CIVIC COMPETENCE AND THE COMPLEMENTARY ROLE OF
EQUAL PROTECTION
The approach taken has focused on the federal Constitution. It
should not be controversial in principle that the states and local
public school systems are not constitutionally entitled to unreasonably
impair, or even to fail to reasonably promote, the minimally effective
operation and functioning of the federal constitutional system. This
is especially true in the area of public schooling, where the contem-
plated functioning of the federal constitutional system historically
has depended crucially on state responsibility and state provision.
What may be more controversial is whether the states or school
systems can be said to have legally caused what is alleged to be a
conspicuous local pattern of broad, dramatically inadequate educa-
tional opportunity, or whether any sort of legal or equitable relief is
reasonably likely to significantly promote improvement in educational
opportunity so as to open the possibility of more nearly universal
minimum civic competence among the electorate.
Currently, patterns of disappointing public school student
achievement are widespread and readily detected. But this only begins
the inquiry. If we are ultimately searching for lack of minimal civic
competence, how are we to operationalize or make concrete and
measurable, in a reasonably objective way, the presence or absence
of this condition? And if we find it, how do we know that such a
condition should, at least in part, be charged to state action or
inaction, rather than being attributed to individual laziness, lack of
educational aptitude, voluntary choice, or some other factor in ways
that do not even indirectly implicate the state?
While reasonably concrete and valid proxies for minimal civic
competence can be settled on once and then applied with only minor
adjustments to all sorts of litigation settings, issues such as state
responsibility are harder to establish, as a matter of broad principle,
with a view to reducing the cost of litigating the issue in every
64. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 824, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 854, 860 (1976).
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successive case. 65 It is hardly sensible to utterly rule out an entire
general theory of action merely because some resolvable intellectual
problems attend it, or because of legal or factual complexity. The
widely recognized cause of action for inequality of educational op-
portunity, brought under state constitutional provisions, certainly
generates at least comparable complexity.6
Based on the case law and the relevant research it seems inevi-
table that the state or school system 67 will often be found to bear
substantial legal causal responsibility for conditions that amount to
plainly insufficient opportunity to acquire broad minimum civic
competence. This is not to suggest, however, that the school or state
will invariably be found to be the sole cause of any local pattern of
discouraging scholastic performance, or that there are no causes of
poor school performance that would ordinarily be thought to be
beyond the potential effective, control of state instrumentalities.
It is often suggested that educational achievement is crucially
affected by variables such as the ability and motivation of students
and students' home environment. 68 More particularly, it has been
65. Cf. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. F.T.C., 482 F.2d 672, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(noting that use of rulemaking power in addition to case-by-case adjudication would avoid the
necessity of requiring the agency to prove certain broad, generic social science-type regularities
individually and repeatedly in each separate case), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
66. See, e.g., Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 350, 651 S.W.2d 90,
95 (1983) (trial involved 287 exhibits and 7,400 pages of transcript); Serrano v. Priest, 180
Cal. App. 3d 1187, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 590, 604 (345 exhibits, 3,736 page transcript; "evidence
at trial revealed nearly a score of statistical techniques that could be and have been used to
measure school finance equity"), petition for review granted, 723 P.2d 1248, 229 Cal. Rptr.
663 (1986); Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 767, 557 P.2d 929, 952, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345,
368 (1976) (en banc) ("almost 4,000 pages of testimonial transcript ... and a clerk's transcript
of almost equal size"), cert. denied, Clowes v. Serrano, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Horton v.
Meskill, 195 Conn. 24, 46, 486 A.2d 1099, 1111 (1985) ("Our decision in Horton I gave ...
only limited guidance about the precise constitutional test by which to measure access to
substantially equal educational opportunities."); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27,
37, 439 N.E.2d 359, 362, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 647 (1982), ("an extended nonjury trial which
produced 23,000 pages of transcript and 400 exhibits"), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139
(1983); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 369, 390 N.E.2d 813, 815 (1979) (2,400
exhibits and 7,530 pages of trial transcript), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980); A. GUTmANN,
supra note 22, at 128 (1987) (identifying three distinctively different basic interpretations of
equality of educational opportunity).
67. That for which the public school system or municipality is responsible is also ultimately
the responsibility of the state as well. See Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340,
349-50, 651 S.W.2d 90, 95 (1983); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 496-97, 513-16, 303 A.2d
273, 285, 294-95, cert. denied sub nom. Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
68. See, e.g., the summary of defendants' analysis in Abbott v. Burke, 100 N.J. 269, 287-
89, 495 A.2d 376, 386 (1985); Elson, Suing to Make Schools Effective, or How to Make a
Bad Situation Worse: A Response to Ratner, 63 TExAs L. REv. 889, 897 (1985).
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argued that "education in and for our kind of society is peculiarly
dependent upon those sentiments, behaviors, and values that typically
arise and are fostered in the cultural milieu of the middle-class
family." '69 Nevertheless, it would be naive to simply assume that
student ability, motivation, and values, along with the home envi-
ronment in general, are invariably not to any degree a reflection of
choices and policies adopted by the municipalities and states. To
locate an educationally significant factor in the home, or in the
psyche of the student, is not necessarily to exclude state causation.
While the issue of the scope or extent of state causal responsibility
raises controversial issues,70 individual attitudes and family structures
and resources may in part reflect "public" decision-making. 71 As one
commentator has observed, "[i]f schools or other public institutions
reliably affect not only the competence but, for example, the aspi-
rations, motivation and ability of those who attend them, then these
aspirations, motivation and ability cannot be regarded as merely
private merits or deficiencies. ' 72
More affirmatively, it has been said that "we have accumulated
a great deal of evidence that faulty policy in the schools is the chief
cause of deficient literacy." 3 This may be because the schools "teach
a fragmented curriculum based on faulty educational theories, ' ' 4 or
because of schools' low academic expectations, 75 or an absence of
sufficient order and discipline in some public schools. 76 Assuming
69. Berger, The Repatriation of the School, in CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN SCHOOLS 81, 83
(J. Bunzel ed. 1985).
70. Cf. O'Neill, Opportunities, Equalities and Education, 7 THEORY & DECISION 275, 289
(1976) ("Disagreements about the analysis of equal educational opportunity derive largely from
disagreements over the boundary between the public and the private domain.").
71. Consider examples as clear and direct as King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (voiding
the "man in the house" rules for excluding otherwise eligible children from certain forms of
welfare assistance). See generally Sunstein, supra note 60. Educationally, it has been asked,
for example, whether high levels of childrens' television watching may perhaps in part reflect
school instructional requirements, or their absence. See E. HIRscH, supra note 21, at 20.
72. O'Neill, supra note 70, at 289.
73. E. HIRSCH, supra note 21, at 20. This article again does not equate minimum civic
competence with bare literacy, but views literacy as plainly one of the prerequisites of civic
competence.
74. Id. at xiii.
75. See J. COLEMAN, T. HOFFER & S. KILGORE, HIGH SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT 178 (1982).
76. See id. The authors of this widely-recognized study conclude specifically that quite
aside from differences in student background:
Apart from mathematics coursework for seniors, the greatest differences in achievement
between private and public schools are accounted for by school-level behavior
variables (that is, the incidence of fights, students threatening teachers, and so forth).
The disciplinary climate of a school, such as the effectiveness and fairness of
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that factors such as low teacher expectations and inadequate discipline
do play some role in low academic achievement rates in some public
schools, as is widely charged,7 7 it is difficult to see low student
achievement as a phenomenon independent of state causation and
utterly immune to any assertion of even partial governmental con-
trol .71
Courts that seek to encourage, through some appropriate judicial
spur, the broader availability of opportunity to acquire minimum
civic competence through the public schools need not single out
particular factors, such as teacher expectations and school discipline,
and judicially endorse their significance. The schools, or the state,
should be allowed by the courts to umpire the social science evidence
based on their own experience, and the courts should not discourage
responsible experimentation in addressing problems of insufficient
educational opportunity. Similarly, the courts should not feel bound
by mere assertions that matters such as school discipline are inevitable
reflections of intractable social pathology, or that for reasons of
bureaucratic interest, public apathy, or hostility to additional school
funding, 79 it is practically infeasible to significantly reduce behavior
such as violence, threats against teachers, drug use, or more passive
noncooperation within schools. The Constitution may require the
undertaking by schools of unpopular or inconvenient reforms. 0
On the approach recommended by this article, the courts should
decide only concrete cases in the least intrusive way, but should not
view minimum civic competency litigation in the familiar, purely
adversarial context, in which a plaintiff in a zero-sum game seeks
substantial compensation and a defendant resists by all permissible
discipline and teacher interest, affect achievement at least in part through their effect
on these school-level behavior variables.
Id. See also D. RAVITCH, THE SCHOOLS WE DESERVE 111 (1985) (interpreting this report as
supporting the view that "school policy affects student achievement and student behavior").
77. Even those generally skeptical of "effective schools" research seem to concede some
consensual support in the evidence for the significance of these two factors. See Elson, supra
note 68, at 898. Cf. Abbott v. Burke, 100 N.J. 269, 278-80, 495 A.2d 376, 381 (1985) (on the
state defendants' own theory, plaintiffs were suffering educationally, if at all, because of
ineffective school management by local school boards).
78. See Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic
Skills, 63 TExAs L. REV. 777, 804 (1985).
79. For example, the familiar finding that school or school district spending is not
correlated with important school output measures, id. at 808; Lujan v. Colorado State Board
of Education, 649 P.2d 1005, 1020 (Colo. 1982), is often cited to blunt the thrust of school
financing system challenges based on the equal protection clause, but it equally suggests that
reduced in-school violence need not await vast infusions of additional public school spending.
80. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1947).
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means. In particular, there should constitutionally and practically be
no need for the plaintiffs to prove that the defendants have acted
negligently, or that moral blame attaches. Once some reasonably
measurable proxy for minimum civic competence is agreed upon, the
burden should fall upon the state, in light of the available social
science evidence,81 to show why, especially in light of the possibilities
for further research and experimentation, not even marginal progress
can reasonably be expected over any reasonable period of time. While
the courts should respect state autonomy, federalism, local educa-
tional priorities, and local educational establishment expertise as to
the practicalities of alternative means, as well as any relevant vested
contractual rights, they should recognize no vested interest in the
perpetuation of school policies that countenance conditions within
the school that are patently disruptive of the educational process.
Not attributing moral blame to the schools may serve the practical
end of reducing any tendency toward defensiveness on the part of
the local educational establishment.82 Likewise, declining to judicially
ratify educationally unsuitable conditions within schools helps to
emphasize that even if particular schools themselves feel powerless
to restore order and discipline internally,83 this is a traditional state
function, and the state should be looked to if necessary for the
restoration of that minimum school order necessary to give meaning
and effect to the Constitution's explicit and implicit scheme of
representative self-government.
81. See sources cited supra notes 73-78.
82. Cf. Elson, supra note 68 (expressing a concern for possible educator demoralization).
Professor Elson generally envisions the litigation in rather harsh, adversarial, hypertechnical,
legalistic terms, featuring battles over evidence admissibility, etc. Id. at 892.
83. This is not to suggest that minimum civic competence is best generated through
penitentiary-like authority structures, but that, for example, even a student whose chronically
disruptive behavior is attributable to some state policy must be given only a limited number
of chances, as well as due process, before his adverse effects on the educational environment
of others must, in fairness to those others, be remedied. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975).
On our theory, the federal Constitution sets at least some minimal ultimate limits on the
range of legitimate local educational policies and priorities in spending and enforcement. Within
limits, the schools may not simply ignore severe discipline problems on the grounds that
addressing them raises some political opposition, or is to some degree time-consuming and
unpleasant, or would impair the image of the schools in the mind of the public. One may
reasonably suspect, on the latter issue, that if a school system is largely anarchic and is
generating large numbers of civic incompetents, this will not be long unrecognized by the
public, and that conscientious reform efforts chosen by the schools themselves, even if judicially
spurred in a general way, may even enhance, rather than impair, the public's perception of
the particular schools. Cf. Elson, supra note 68, at 910 ("judicial oversight could diminish
the public's confidence in teachers, administrators .... 19).
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Admittedly, neither the schools nor the courts can directly meas-
ure civic competence itself. Some reasonably close proxy that is more
readily quantifiable must be selected, but the inevitable tradeoff
between perfect validity and perfect reliability of measurement is
familiar and inevitable . 4 Standard achievement tests of basic literacy
skills commend themselves on the theory that civic competence re-
quires literacy at a minimum. Most schools already voluntarily ad-
minister some form of such tests; 5 judicially requiring this practice
would therefore be only minimally intrusive.
There are familiar objections to such an approach, but they do
not seem compelling. Pencil and paper achievement tests are not
invariably a transparent window into the mind of the student,8 6 and
there is some risk of institutional cheating, or at least of "teaching
to the test." The obvious responses must be that institutional cheating
or misreporting of scores will be rare, or at least difficult to duplicate
every year, and that even if otherwise illiterate students are taught
little else other than to take a standardized test reasonably well,
substantial constitutional progress has been made.
Focusing judicial attention on standardized testing instruments
already voluntarily adopted by the schools, or similar to those already
adopted, has the additional virtue of minimizing the sacrifice in terms
of the values of federalism, 87 deference to legislative branches,"8 and
deference to professional judgment8 9 that may be required. These
interests are of some moment, but they may rightly be sacrificed in
some small measure where this is necessary to remedy what may
amount to a continuing constitutional travesty. It is important to
remember that the courts need not dictate to the states or schools
the methods to be used to achieve minimal progress, 90 or otherwise
84. See Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 OMo ST. L.J. 469, 470 (1987) (inverse
relationship between measuring the right thing and measuring it well).
85. See Preovolos, supra note 9, at 115; Elson, supra note 68, at 902.
86. See Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 748, 557 P.2d 929, 939, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345,
355 (1976) (en banc).
87. See id. at 762, 557 P.2d at 948, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 364 (citing San Antonio School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40-44 (1973)).
88. See McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 644-45, 285 S.E.2d 156, 165 (1981) (citing San
Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973)).
89. See Elson, supra note 68, at 913-14.
90. See Seattle School Dist. No. I v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 520, 585 P.2d 71, 96 (1978)
(en banc) (the choice of means of discharging constitutional duty may be left to the state
legislature). It should be borne in mind that a pattern of educational opportunity can be
attacked as unconstitutional without the plaintiff or court having to identify any particular
policy, regulation, or statute as itself unconstitutional. See Washakie County School Dist. No.
I v. Hersehler, 606 P.2d 310, 335 (Wyo. 1980).
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constrain legitimate local choice, judgment, and experimentation. 91
The schools reasonably should be asked not to assume that their
innovation and experimentation will be judicially endorsed if such
efforts result only in perpetual failure, where apparently comparable
schools employing different but apparently transferable techniques
are consistently more successful. To the extent that the courts even-
tually do constrain consistently inferior educational policy choice, it
should be remembered that greater judicial deference is called for at
the most advanced, highly technical or professional levels of education 92
than at the more rudimentary levels with which this article is exclu-
sively concerned.
Any reliance on standardized paper-and-pencil testing ordinarily
raises issues of unfairness toward those particularly disadvantaged
students least prepared to succeed on such instruments. It is important
to recall that in our context, the disadvantaged can only gain from
their use. Standardized tests, on the approach suggested herein, are
not to be used to elevate allegedly objective achievement requirements
so as to discourage or exclude the disadvantaged. 93 They are instead
to be used to focus judicial attention with precision on the need to
devise more constitutionally effective educational institutions and
practices, in and outside of schools, that redound to the educational
benefit of the most disadvantaged. 94
It is no less important to consider the range of reactions on the
part of school officials and individual teachers 95 to the approach
advocated herein. One commentator has concluded that "[l]eft to
their own devices, incompetent and careless educators can be expected
to continue and defend their past practices, regardless of the harm
91. See McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 647, 285 S.E.2d 156, 167 (1981); Board of
Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 380-82, 390 N.E.2d 813, 822 (1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1015 (1980).
92. Cf. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1978), discussed in Elson,
supra note 68, at 914. Plainly, courts are in a better position to evaluate literacy or illiteracy
than whether an individual would be a competent physician.
93. Cf. Chambers, supra note 16, at 60 n.21 (expressing misgivings about the equity of
using achievement tests to raise academic standards).
94. This is not to suggest that it is clear that using more demanding standardized
achievement tests as a sorting device must necessarily have an aggregate adverse impact on the
educational achievement of the disadvantaged. Compare id. with Finn, supra note 30, at 17,
22 (suggesting that higher academic standards, as commonly measured, may even tend to
reduce the dropout problem).
95. It can hardly be assumed that all public schools are responsively hierarchical, such
that convincing the highest authority levels insures immediate and full compliance or imple-
mentation at all subordinate levels. See Elson, supra note 68, at 906 n.74.
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to their students." Professor Elson has also observed more san-
guinely that "[u]nlike the situation of the individual educator who
is charged with acts of personal incompetence or carelessness toward
an individual student, no substantial internal restraints discourage
school administrators from adopting more effective pedagogical prac-
tices once the superiority of those practices becomes apparent." 97
The approach advocated by this article again does not rely on or
seek to fix individual blame, as through allegations of negligence,
but realistically recognizes the possibility of vested educational estab-
lishment interests, fear of change, unresponsive bureaucracies, and
institutional inertia. If it were generally true that administrators
distinctively gravitated with reasonable dispatch away from failed
and mediocre policies toward demonstrably superior policies, im-
provement would proceed spontaneously without the need for coer-
cive state inducement. 9 Thankfully, there is evidence that school
reform can be reasonably successful even where it is initially imposed,
in greater detail than this article envisions, by parties other than the
immediately affected school officials themselves. 99
Looking to the role of the public at large, or the taxpayers, it
is possible to object that a proposal along the lines advocated herein
will in fact be educationally counterproductive, as it may lull the
public into believing that significant improvement in the schools can
be accomplished without massive infusions of new funds.' °° This does
seem possible, at least in the short term, before reality catches up
with what turns out to be an overly optimistic public expectation. It
seems equally likely, at the very least, that a public climate broadly
supportive of the sort of judicially-inspired educational reform ad-
vocated herein would also tend to be sympathetic to the expenditures
reasonably necessary to effectuate public school reforms, at least
within the limits discussed above.10' Judicially-spurred civic compe-
tence opportunity reform may even turn out to tend to be tied, as a
political package, to increased or equalized school funding in other
respects. It is also possible that the public may become more generally
96. Id. at 913.
97. Id.
98. See generally M. GORBACHEV, PERESTROIKA (1987) (observing that bureaucratic reform
is not bound to occur rapidly, universally, or spontaneously).
99. See Ratner, supra note 63, at 927.
100. See Elson, supra note 68, at 911.
101. See supra section V on the tendency toward the undersupply of basic educational
opportunity.
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sympathetic to increased public school funding only when the public
perceives that the schools are capable of dealing more adequately
with problems such as dramatic illiteracy rates.
Realistically we should expect minimum civic competence op-
portunity litigation to have a significant equalizing effect in practice,
even though such litigation does not rely on the equal protection
clause. The approach advocated herein may afford some of the
benefits of equal protection litigation with few of the disadvantages
of such litigation. We have seen not only that equal protection
litigation fails to capture the essence of the public issue addressed
above, 10 2 but that equal protection litigation offers no bargain in
manageability,0 3 even if thorny issues such as distinguishing absolute
from merely relative deprivation' °4 are set aside.
VII. CONCLUSION
There are deeper reasons for not relying on the equal protection
clause in this general area. If education is not thought of as a
constitutionally fundamental right, 0 an equal protection approach
will likely have little payoff, since most of the inequalities generated
by public educational systems can be defended under minimum
scrutiny. Even if the governmental interest in respecting local control
of educational systems0° is rejected as illusory in the case of impov-
erished school districts, 0 7 it will often be possible for the state to
portray substantial increases in, or even equalization of, school
funding as necessarily coming at the expense of other significant state
or local programs of benefit to the public. 08 Taking educational
opportunity to be a constitutionally fundamental right, especially in
102. See generally supra section II. Most fundamentally, "[t]he Equal Protection Clause is
not addressed to the minimal sufficiency but rather to the unjustifiable inequalities of state
action." San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 89 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting), quoted in Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 347, 651 S.W.2d
90, 93 (1983).
103. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
104. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 64-65 (White, J., dissenting).
105. See supra section 11.
106. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 49-50; Goodwin, The Crisis in Public Education and a
Constitutional Rationale for Federal Intervention, 1988 DET. C.L. REv. (publication forthcom-
ing).
107. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 64-65 (White, J., dissenting).
108. See Serrano v. Priest, 180 Cal. App. 3d 1187, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 619 n.39 ("Public
education receives approximately one-half of the state's budget. Out of the other half, the
state must meet competing claims for important state interests such as welfare and medical
assistance, roads and parks and public safety."), petition for review granted, 723 P.2d 1248,
229 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1986).
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light of the rigorous strict scrutiny equal protection implications that
would apparently follow, is unavoidably deeply controversial. His-
torically, there has long been an unresolvable dialectic between ex-
panding and equalizing educational opportunity, and the desire of
many parents to provide not merely absolutely good, but relatively
better educational opportunities for their own children. 109,Despite the
force of the arguments in favor of genuine equality of educational
opportunity, or something approaching it," ° it seems clear that any
reasonably close approach to genuine equality of educational oppor-
tunity, even among public school students, would involve uncom-
fortably deep state intrusion into the familiar realm of family
autonomy and parental authority over the scope of their own chil-
dren's education. I Until such time as this historical conflict of goals
can be resolved, or until such time as the basic terms of equal
protection jurisprudence are fundamentally changed, advocates of
educational opportunity minima cannot look to equal protection
litigation for consistently reliable help.
109. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 49; Board of Educ. v. Waiter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 377-
78, 390 N.E.2d 813, 820 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980).
110. See, e.g., Richards, Equal Opportunity and School Financing: Towards a Moral Theory
of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 U. Cm. L. REV. 32, 48-59 (1973).
111. See J. FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND THE FAMLmY 51-67 (1984); A,
GUTMANN, supra note 22, at 132.
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